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There are very few experts in Communist Chinese law in the United States
and, for that matter, few even in China. None of the very few who are experts
is an expert in the sense in which we usually use the word. That is so for
several reasons, chief of which is the scarcity of law in China on which to be
an expert. Although thirty years have passed since the establishment of the
People's Republic of China (PRC) in October, 1949, Peking is just now
adopting its first code, even though the PRC is a civil law country. Nor have
there been many individual statutes. From the end of 1963 until quite re-
cently, there was virtually no legislation adopted in the PRC. This has meant
that for the past thirty years there have been no laws providing for the punish-
ment of such common crimes as murder, rape, theft, and arson.'
I. Sources of Information on Laws in the PRC
(A) Statutory Law
In line with its having a small body of law, the PRC has had few of the
publications that a legal scholar or lawyer usually needs in order to become an
expert in his field. The statutes that have been adopted have been collected in
two statutory series covering the years 1949 to 1963, but since 1963 no addi-
tion has been made to the last of these two series. Court decisions have never
been systematically published; in fact, few of them have been published at all.
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Between 1949 and 1966 only about 350 legal monographs and 248 transla-
tions of legal monographs from other countries were published; after 1966,
however, the publication of legal materials virtually ceased and has not yet
resumed in any meaningful sense.
In the early years of the PRC, there were a few valuable government ga-
zettes that yielded much important information on law. For instance, the
little known publication Chung yang cheng fa kung bao (Central Political-
Legal Gazette), published between late 1949 and 1954, contained many frank
and revealing statements and articles on judicial activities. Its unintended
availability abroad is one of the factors making the initial period of legal
development in the PRC the period for which research data can be most easily
gathered. Unfortunately, American legal scholars have almost totally
neglected this valuable source. For many years no government gazettes of the
People's Republic of China were available; in fact, the publication of such
gazettes may have ceased altogether.
(B) Law Journals
In the early years of the PRC there were very few law journals in existence.
Of these, two-Zhengfa jiaoxue (Political-Legal Teaching) and Zhengfa
xuexi (Political-Legal Study)-were published for internal circulation only
and were not available to legal scholars outside of China. Fa xue (Jurispru-
dence), a Shanghai-based law journal, was published between 1956 and 1958;
it contained many scholarly articles on Chinese law, but was not published
after 1958. The PRC's only long-lived law journal was Zhengfa yanjiu (Po-
litical-Legal Research). It was published from May 1954 to May 1966. From
that time until very recently, China has had no law journals. In the last few
months, however, China has begun publishing them once again. Three of
them-Renmin sifa (People's Judiciary), Renmin jiancia (People's Pro-
curacy), and Renmin gongan (People's Public Security)-are probably for
internal circulation only, but the other two-Minzhu yu fazhi (Democracy
and the Legal System) and Faxueyanjiu (Legal Science Research)-are to be
available outside the PRC. Minzhu yufazhi (Democracy and the Legal Sys-
tem) is not yet available, but the Library of Congress has received the first
(April) issue of Faxue yanjiu (Legal Science Research).
(C) News and Personal Accounts
Prior to the Cultural Revolution that started in 1966, the Chinese newspa-
pers were a fertile source of legal information, but for about a decade now,
even they have contained very little legal information. In the early 1970s
people outside of China were forced to rely on information provided by
Westerners who had visited China and talked with legal officials. Such mate-
rial, however, was of limited utility not only because it usually contained
many biases, but also because these visitors had very limited access to the
legal system. Now that the post-Mao leadership is attempting to strengthen
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the legal system, the newspapers and some other serial publications have
again become valuable sources of information on legal development.
Thus, the shortage of published materials on the limited law that China did
have has imposed severe limitations on our knowledge of Chinese law. Fortu-
nately, it appears that publications are going to become more readily avail-
able in the coming months.
II. Chinese Attitude Toward Law
The attitude of the Communist Chinese toward law3 is ultimately the major
factor limiting both the development of Chinese law and our knowledge of it.
For one thing, the Chinese were for a long time quite secretive about their
legal development. In fact, disclosure of information about the judicial sys-
tem was made punishable under the State Secrets Act which was enacted in
the early years of the PRC. Although many areas of judicial activity still
remain closed to the view of outsiders, the Chinese have become more willing
to bare their legal system to outsiders since the death of Mao. They are doing
this in part to reassure prospective traders from Western nations who fear
that China's lack of a sophisticated legal system will make trading with it very
risky.
The Chinese have been more than secretive about their legal development,
however. For a long time they did not regard legal development as important.
Various factors have contributed to this attitude. For one thing, the Chinese
Communists have been extremely anti-intellectual in various periods of the
PRC's history, and they have regarded the study of law and legal develop-
ment as the undertakings of intellectuals. A related attitude has regarded
specialization in almost any field as a development that will harm the interests
of the workers and peasants who have been extremely exalted in theory,
particularly by certain elements in Chinese politics. Both Chinese history and
Marxist-Leninist ideology have contributed to the Communist Chinese being
generally suspicious of lawyers and courts. They often have regarded lawyers
and courts not as instruments of justice, but as servants of the bourgeoisie
who use the cover of the law to sacrifice the interests of the workers and
peasants.
All these attitudes have been behind China's experiment with developing
an informal legal system that somehow serves the interest of the "masses."
These attitudes ultimately resulted in an outright rejection of law. During the
Cultural Revolution the radical faction quite often called for the "smashing"
of the courts, the procuracy, and the public security (police) organs. An
editorial praising lawlessness even appeared in the leading Chinese newspa-
per during this period. The few lawyers that China had were not allowed to
practice their profession,' and legal education and legal publication virtually
ceased.
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In the post-Mao period the leadership is retreating from the admitted ex-
cesses of this antilegalism. It has given quite graphic descriptions of the per-
vasive miscarriages of justice that occurred in the period when radical atti-
tudes were in control and are once again attempting to develop law and legal
institutions in China. In so doing, they have two major motives. First, the
post-Mao leadership is determined to modernize China and to do this, they
know they must have the cooperation and support of the people, particularly
China's intellectuals. They are aware that the people, and particularly the
intellectuals, have been profoundly demoralized by the abuses that have oc-
curred for many years. They believe that reforming the legal system is essen-
tial to winning the confidence and cooperation of the people.'
Second, the current leadership believes that they must build up China's
foreign trade in order to modernize successfully, and they know that Western
traders are quite wary of China's legal system. The pragmatists among the
leadership believe that economic development necessitates regularizing the
legal system. The codes and the foreign investment statute about to be for-
mally adopted are the most concrete expression so far of the post-Mao
leadership's desire to strengthen the legal system.
The recent, fruitful work on codification is not the first effort of the
Chinese to draw up and adopt codes. In the mid-1950s, China's policies
toward law were very similar to those that have appeared in the period since
Mao's death in September 1976. In the mid-1950s the Chinese were experi-
menting with the adoption of an essentially Soviet-style legal system. At that
time China also drafted a code, spoke of judicial independence, promoted
legal education, permitted the legal profession to bud, and promoted open
trials and the right to defense. But these tentative moves toward a stronger
legal system were aborted in mid-1957 when the Chinese perceived that the
control of the Communist Party over Chinese society was being threatened
by even the modest legal development that had been permitted. Although
there was another brief period of concern with codification and legal devel-
opment in the early 1960s, China's legal system has only recently begun to
recover from the massive assault against it that started in 1957. Those of us
who are familiar with the period between 1957 and 1977 are very cautious in
assessing the long-range import of the most recent developments.
It cannot be denied that the recent adoption of codes is of tremendous
significance and is an extremely promising development. Without the devel-
opment of a comprehensive statutory basis, China's legal development
would have continued to be very thwarted. The appearance of the codes
promises to contribute to the regularization of criminal punishment in the
PRC after a protracted period during which judicial cadres have had very
little to rely on in arriving at decisions. It promises to elevate the status of law
'See, e.g., Buxbaum, Rule of Law Evident in China Trade Prospects, Legal Times of
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cited as Buxbaum].
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to a major factor in China's national life. But it would be naive to expect that
the adoption of a code will be a panacea correcting all the deficiencies that
non-Communist Westerners perceive in China's legal system. For one thing,
it is quite possible that when we examine the contents of these codes, we will
discover many of the vague and sweeping provisions that have appeared in
China's past legislation. There still may be no presumption of innocence and
there may be some provision for retroactive and analogous application of
criminal laws.6
We should also not forget that the issue of the relationship between the
Party and the legal system is far from being resolved. Although there has
been renewed talk of judicial independence, there has continued to be talk of
Party leadership of the legal organs. Thus, while one is likely to see a period
during which the Party gives greater latitude to the legal organs in the settle-
ment of individual cases, it would be naive to believe that the Communist
Party is willing to surrender its right to intervene in judicial affairs when it
believes that it must do so to protect or advance its own interests. Further-
more, there continues to be a large number of people in China who support
radical policies even though Mao himself is dead and his chief supporters
have been purged. These people are being called "the whatever faction"
because their platform is that "whatever" Mao said must continue to be
applied in China. The moderate elements in the Chinese leadership continue
to jockey with this group in an ongoing leadership struggle. We should not
believe that antilegalism is dead in China. It is not. We also should not believe
that a current effort to convince the Chinese people that Mao was a supporter
of legal development is going to succeed, for it is likely that the Chinese
people know that Mao too called for the smashing of the legal organs during
the Cultural Revolution.
It seems likely that the Chinese will continue to leave Party affairs outside
the sphere of the law, even when these Party affairs involve crime. Although
the Chinese recently adopted a revised Arrest and Detention Act, Chinese
jurists have said that this law would not apply to the "Gang of Four," the
group of radical leaders, including Mao's wife, who were arrested about a
month after Mao's death. Also, the political dissidents who have been ar-
rested in Peking apparently are not going to come under the terms of this Act,
for the Chinese are reported to have said that these dissidents really weren't
"arrested," but were merely undergoing "isolation and examination."
Even assuming that legal development continues to enjoy the support of
the Chinese leadership, China is going to have a difficult time correcting the
abuses of the past and guiding its legal development onto a new path. It is
short of legal personnel, for one thing. For many, many years China's law
'Article 79 of the Criminal Law, endorsed July 1, 1979, provides: "Those who commit of-
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schools were closed, and there simply are not many people in China trained in
the law. Although the Chinese are now again promoting legal education, it
will be many years before the PRC is truly back on its feet.7 With a popula-
tion of about 950 million people, China has an almost insatiable need for
people trained in the law, and the law schools are not going to be able to make
any noticeable dent in that need for many years. It also should be apparent
that China is going to have to work very hard to make sufficient legal publica-
tions available to those who need them. China's bibliographic apparatus for
law is very undeveloped as well.
The post-Mao leadership is going to have to work very hard to change
attitudes toward law in China, both among the general population and
among legal cadres. Because the radicals made legal cadres suffer for so many
years for supporting law as a specialized discipline and a specialized profes-
sion, and for even suggesting that the Party should not interfere with the legal
organs, legal cadres in China are almost certain to have what the Chinese call
"lingering fear." There is a lingering fear that they will suffer and even be
killed if they now support policies that later fall out of favor. They are very
afraid of supporting the losing side in any outright leadership struggle that
might develop later on.
In addition to the "lingering fear," the Chinese also are going to have to
contend with lingering ignorance. For two decades the climate in China has
not been one in which a person could learn a lot about interpreting and
applying the law correctly. Ever since the ouster of the Gang of Four in
October 1976, the Chinese have been carrying out a propaganda campaign to
foster obedience to the law both among the people and among officials,8 but
the prolonged duration of the campaign indicates that the Chinese do not
believe that they have yet stamped out disrespect for and ignorance of the
law. It is quite likely that even officials with the best of intentions and the
most courageous of attitudes will have difficulty interpreting and applying
the law properly simply because they do not have good training in law.
To summarize, the prospects for legal development in China are better
than they have been at any time since the mid-1950s, but the Chinese are likely
to make slow headway even if one assumes that the leadership continues to
promote legal development.
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